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Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 903 F.3d 
403 (4th Cir. 2018) 
 
Thomas Mooney-Myers 
 
The Sierra Club alleged Dominion violated the Clean Water Act 
by allowing arsenic to leak from coal ash storage pits into state waters.  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found for the polluter, using a 
narrow definition of point source. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit 
deferred to agency interpretation of the polluter’s permit to find no 
violation occurred.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Company arose from 
the leaching of arsenic from coal pits managed by the Virginia Electric & 
Power Company (“Dominion”) through groundwater into the nearby 
navigable waters.1 The Sierra Club alleged this movement of arsenic 
violated the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Dominion permits issued 
by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (“VDEQ”).2   
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia held that (i) Dominion coal pits were point 
sources as defined by the CWA and thus Dominion was liable for 
violations of the CWA, and (ii) Dominion complied with its VDEQ 
discharge permits.3 The Fourth Circuit found Dominion’s coal pits were 
not point sources and Dominion had not violated the CWA and affirmed 
Dominion’s compliance with their VDEQ permits.4   
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The CWA was passed in 1972 to improve and maintain the 
quality of navigable waters in the United States, by prohibiting the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable water from a point source.5 The 
CWA only allows the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to 
regulate point sources, defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance,” and allows for discharge in compliance with an EPA 
issued permit.6  
Pollution from solid waste like coal ash is regulated under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).7 RCRA 
distinguishes between hazardous waste, which is federally managed, and 
                                                     
1. Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 406 
(4th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. at 408-09. 
4. Id.   
5. Id. at 406. 
6. Id. at 406-07; see 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14). 
7. Id. at 407; see 42 U.S.C. § 6901. 
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non-hazardous waste, which is primarily managed by local authorities.8  
For RCRA and CWA managed pollutants, facilities handling such waste 
must obtain a permit from the EPA or an EPA-approved state authority 
that requires compliance with national criteria.9  Dominion’s permits 
were issued by the VDEQ, which administers programs under the CWA 
and RCRA.10 
From 1953 to 2014, Dominion ran a coal-fired power plant in 
Chesapeake, Virginia.11  The power plant generated waste coal ash which 
was stored and processed on site.12  The VDEQ-approved disposal 
method involved depositing the coal ash slurry into settling ponds then 
pumping the excess water into the nearby navigable waters once the ash 
settled.13  Additionally, Dominion was required to monitor and test local 
groundwater and submit those results to the VDEQ.14 
In 2002, Dominion detected arsenic in the groundwater that 
exceeded the conditions of their permit, and per its RCRA permit, 
developed and enacted a corrective plan.15  The VDEQ approved the plan 
in 2008, and incorporated the plan into the RCRA permit in 2011.16  
Dominion halted operation of the Chesapeake plant in 2014 and 
stopped depositing coal ash on site in October 2015.17  In 2016, 
Dominion submitted a plan to the VDEQ describing their permanent 
shutdown plans under their RCRA and CWA permits.18 
Sierra Club filed their complaint in March of 2015 under the 
citizen suit provision of the CWA, alleging three violations and seeking 
civil penalties and injunctive relief.19  Count One alleged the leakage of 
arsenic from the settling pits violated §1311(a)’s of the CWA prohibition 
against unauthorized discharge from a point source.20  Count Two and 
Count Three alleged Dominion had violated terms of their CWA permits, 
respectively Condition II.R and Condition II.F.21 The lower court held 
the Dominion coal ash piles were point sources, under the CWA 
definition that includes a “discernable, confined, and discrete 
conveyance.”22 Additionally, the lower court held that the CWA covered 
discharges into groundwater where a “direct hydrological connection” 
existed linking a point source to navigable waters, and that such a 
                                                     
8. Id. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. at 408. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id. 
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
19. Id.  
20. Id.  
21. Id.  
22. Id. at 409-10 (see Appalachian Power v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
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connection existed between the coal pits and navigable waters.23 This 
case came before the Fourth Circuit on appeal by both parties; Sierra 
Club appealed the lower’s court’s holding on Dominion’s compliance 
with the VDEQ permits, and Dominion appealed the lower court’s 
holding that the coal pits were point sources.24 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Circuit addressed whether Dominion’s coal settling 
ponds fulfilled the definition of point source and whether Dominion had 
complied with the terms of their CWA permits. 
A. Point Source Determination 
The Fourth Circuit held that the CWA is limited in the scope of 
its regulation to point sources, which are defined as “any discernible, 
confined, and discrete conveyance”25 and that "[U]nchanneled and 
uncollected surface waters” are not considered point sources.26 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding regarding a “direct 
hydrological connection” but held this “simple causal link does not fulfill 
the Clean Water Act’s requirement that the discharge be from a point 
source.”27 On appeal, Dominion contested that the coal pits constituted a 
point source.28 In their analysis of this issue, the Fourth Circuit used 
three lines of reasoning: (1) the physical nature of the source of 
pollutants and the nature of the conveyance, (2) the intent of the source, 
and (3) the ability to measure the conveyance of pollution.29   
 First, the Fourth Circuit considered the “carefully defined terms” 
of the CWA to conclude that the facility must be involved in 
conveyances that are discrete, not generalized.30  The Fourth Circuit 
determined the Dominion coal pits did not fit within the given examples 
of point sources due to the nature of the pits and the diffuse nature of the 
movement of arsenic.31 
Second, the Fourth Circuit addressed the intent of the potential 
point source and held that a point source need not be the source of the 
pollutants but does need to be the method of conveyance.32  Here, the 
                                                     
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 409. 
25. Id. at 410 (citing Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1373). 
26. Id. at 409 (see Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1373).   
27. Id. at 409. 
28. Id. at 409-10. 
29. Id. at 410. 
30. Id. at 411 (citing Appalachian Power Co., 545 F.2d at 1373). 
31. Id. at 410-11. 
32. Id. at 411 (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105, 124 S.Ct. 1537, 158 L.Ed.2d 264 (2004) (“[A] point 
source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the 
pollutant to ‘navigable waters’”)). 
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Fourth Circuit determined the Dominion coal pits were not discrete 
points and did not function in that manner.33 
Third, the Fourth Circuit considered the purpose of the CWA in 
terms of Congress’s goal to target measurable discharges of pollutants.34 
Citing the CWA’s enforcement scheme, the Fourth Circuit determined a 
point source must be measurable in order to be regulated under the 
CWA.35  Here, where the discharge “… is diffuse and not the product of 
a discrete conveyance …” and the act of measuring that discharge is “… 
virtually impossible,”  the Fourth Circuit held that the nature of the coal 
pit discharges was incompatible with the regulatory scheme of the 
CWA.36 
Sierra Club contended the coal pits were point sources because 
they acted as “containers,” which are referenced as a point source in the 
CWA definitions.37  The Fourth Circuit responded that this critically left 
out “conveyance,” and that conveyance was still necessary to qualify as a 
point source.38  The Fourth Circuit further distinguished the need for and 
relevance of conveyance from a point source,39 even when the original 
source was from a pit or pile.40 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
holdings of the lower court and found the coal pits were not point 
sources, and therefore Dominion did not violate § 1311(a) of the CWA.41 
B. Compliance with Terms of Permit: Conditions II.F and II.R 
Condition II.F reads, “[e]xcept in compliance with this permit … 
it shall be unlawful for any person to … [d]ischarge [pollutants] into 
state waters.”42  The Fourth Circuit held the phrase “discharge” in the 
context of the CWA specifically meant discharge from a point source.43  
Based on the holding that Dominion’s coal pits did not constitute a point 
source, the Fourth Circuit held Dominion had not violated the terms of 
Condition II.F.44 
                                                     
33. Id. 
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. Id. (see 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (11)). 
37. Id. at 412 (see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 412-13 (citing United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 
368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[W]hen [the pipe] system ‘fail[ed] because of flaws in 
the construction, … the escape of liquid from the confined system [was] from a point 
source.’”)). 
40. Id. at 413 (citing Sierra Club v. Abston Const. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 
(5th Cir. 1980). (“[T]he court, while recognizing that the source of the pollutant . . . 
might be a spoil or refuse pile, noted that the facilities that actually transport the 
pollutant must be point sources . . . .”)). 
41. Id.  
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 413-14. 
44. Id. at 414. 
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Condition II.R is a provision for all CWA discharge permits and 
broadly provides that “solids, sludges, and other pollutants … shall be 
disposed of in a manner … to prevent any pollutant … from entering 
state water.”45  While the Fourth Circuit acknowledged this provision, 
read out of context, it seems to prohibit any pollutant from entering state 
waters.46 However, the Fourth Circuit held the provision should be 
interpreted in the context of the limits of the CWA, and so is limited to 
the regulation of discharge from point sources.47  Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit referenced the VDEQ’s consistent interpretation of 
Condition II.R to apply only to point source discharges and referred to 
the need in contracts to hold parties to their common understanding 
rather than a strict meaning of the law.48  Under this interpretation, the 
Fourth Circuit held Dominion had not violated Condition II.R of their 
VDEQ permit.49 Neither the lower court nor the Fourth Circuit provided 
a test or explanation for their deference to the VDEQ interpretation.50 
 
C.  Role of RCRA 
 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit briefly discussed the relevance of 
Sierra Club’s claim under the CWA as compared to RCRA, because the 
Dominion monitoring requirements and the 2011 corrective plan were 
both developed under the RCRA permit.51  The Fourth Circuit stated that 
had the Sierra Club wanted to challenge the manner in which Dominion 
managed their coal ash storage method, a claim would have been more 
appropriate under the RCRA citizen suit provision.52 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit relied on a narrow definition of point source 
to determine that Dominion had not violated § 1311(a) of the CWA or 
the conditions of their discharge permits. While this narrow reading 
makes bringing claims based on point sources cumbersome in the Fourth 
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s reference to the role of RCRA indicates 
environmental groups should carefully select the provision under which 
they bring their claim if they want to prevail. 
                                                     
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id. (citing Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, 845 
F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 2017)). 
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 413 (“While we might have wished for more explanation 
from the district court in support of its decision to defer . . . we agree with both 
the VDEQ and Dominion that the subject Conditions must be read in context to 
give them their appropriate meaning and scope.”). 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
